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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
trustworthy to warrant its being admitted. The ease illustrates
the modern trend.' There is a feeling that all men hold death in
awe and experience a physical revulsion towards its unknown and
This the courts apparently are
unascertainable consequences!
willing to recognize, and rightly so, as sufficient assurance of
trustworthiness, without any requirement of a belief in God or
a hereafter.
There is some authority that the credibility of the dying
There
declarant may be impeached by a showing of atheism.'
would not seem to be any more valid reason for permitting a
showing of atheism to destroy credibility than to permit it to
Why admit a declaration
make the declaration inadmissible.'
only to leave it discredited by a clever lawyer playing upon the
religious prejudices of the jury?
-DONALD F. Br cx.

INJUNCTIONS - EQUITA3LE SERVITUDES - BOARDING HOUSE
AS "RESIDENCE PURPOSE". - In a suit to enjoin the operation of
a boarding house on property subject to a covenant limiting the
use to residential purposes only, the court, on appeal, dissolved the
injunction holding the operation of a boarding house not violative
of the covenant providing that "said land shall not be used otherwise than for residence purposes, and shall not be used for a
sanatorium, hospital or infirmary, and no apartment-house shall
be erected thereon". Beck, P. J., dissented vigorously on the
ground that both the spirit and the letter of the covenant were
violated. John Hancock Life Insurance Go. v. Davis
It is an elementary rule of law that covenants restricting
land should be strictly construed in favor of the free and untrammeled use of property.' The majority of the court, pur'State v. Hood, 63 W. Va. 182, 59 S. E. 971 (1907). State v. Williams,
36 Idaho 214, 209 Pac. 1068 (1922). People v. Lim Foon, 29 Cal. App. 270,
155 Pac. 477 (1915). State v. Yee Gueng, 57 Ore. 509, 112 Pac. 424 (1910).
Perry's Case, 3 Grat. 631 (1846). Hronek v. People, 134 Il. 139, 24 N. E.

861 (1890).

'2 WI GORE ON EVIDENCE (1904) § 1443.
'State v. Elliott, 45 Iowa 486 (1877). Nesbit v. State, 43 Ga. 238 (1871).
5As to this related problem note (1930) 9 N. C. L. Rev. 77.

1160 S. E. 393 (Ga. 1931).
2J ones v. Williams, 56 Wash. 588, 106 Pac. 166 (1910); Hutchinson v.
Ulrich, 145 Ill. 336, 34 N. E. 556 (1893); Be Walsh, 175 Mass. 68, 55 N. E.

1043 (1900).
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RECENT CASE COMMENTS
porting to follow this rule, probably elicited from the words of
the covenant a meaning which they did not naturally and normally import. This application of the rule, however, is no more
excessive than that found in other cases.8
West Virginia has gone equally as far and probably overreached itself in construing a restrictive covenant too strictly.
In the case of Deutsch & Cohen v. Mortgage Securities Co.' the
court held that the erection of two one-family dwelling houses
on, a lot was not in violation of a covenant "that no dwelling shall
be built upon the said lot except a one-family house". The same
principle was adhered to in a somewhat startling decision where
the court held the construction of a spur railroad track not violative of a covenant not to build any buildings "for other than
dwelling or residence purposes" upon the premises."
The word "residence" used in such restrictive covenants,
excluding other uses, refers to the settled abode of persons.' The
common meaning of the word hardly includes such commercial
uses as "boarding", or the next step, operating a restaurant.
This is the view taken by the dissent. It is supported by a Massachusetts casd where the court held that the keeping of boarders
and roomers to the number of twelve at one time was violative of
a restriction in a deed limiting the building upon the premises
to a "dwelling house to be used exclusively as a residence for a
private family". A similar position was taken by the Michigan
sHunter Tract Improvement Co. v. Corporation of Catholic Bishop, 98
Wash. 112, 167 Pac. 100 (1917) (occupation of a residence by twelve or
fifteen members of a religious organization for worship, initiation and instruction of children held not violative of a covenant to use the premises
"for residence purposes only".); Hunt v. Held, 90 Ohio St. 280, 107 N. E.
765 (1914) (holding that the building of a double house on one lot was not
in violation of a covenant to use the premises "for residence purposes
only".)
'96 W. Va. 676, 123 S.E. 793 (1925).
5Neekamp v. Huntington Chamber of Commerce, 99 W. Va. 388, 129 S.
E. 314 (1925). Cf. Flynn v. N. Y., W. & B. Ry. Co. (1916) (where the
court took a practical view of a covenant that "no building or structure for
any business purpose whatsoever shall be erected on said premises" and
held the construction of a railway across the lots a violation of the terms
of the covenant.)
In the recent case of Kaminsky v. Barr, 106 W. Va. 201, 145 S. E. 267
(1928) the court seemed to adopt a liberal view in spirit, if not in words,
when it granted relief to the plaintiff who had violated the covenant himself saying that the establishment of several stores did not so change the
character of the neighborhood from a residence section, under the terms of
the covenant, into a business district as to preclude relief, and compelled the
defendant to observe a set-back line to the same extent which the plaintiff
had conformed thereto.
oore v. Stevens, 90 Fla. 879, 106 So. 901, 43 A. L. R. 1127 (1925).
7Sayles
v. Hall, 210 Mass. 281, 96 N. E. 712 (1911).
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court when it held that a "condition that no store, factory or
building, other than a dwelling house" should be erected, "and
that the said premises shall be used for residence purposes only"
prohibited the construction of a double house though under the
same roof and with but a single front entrance.8
If restrictive covenants are to be recognized as available
juristic devices it hardly seems warranted to defeat them by such
indirections as strained constructions of common words.,

-FREDmuc

INTERNAL

REVENUE -

H. BARNETT.

GAIN ACCRUING ON EXCHANGE OF
Plaintiff, owner of 255

SHARES OF STOCK AS TAXABUE INCOME. -

shares in Bank A which consolidated with two other institutions
to form Bank X, exchanged his shares of stock for those of the
new bank and received 340 shares of the new stock which had a
higher aggregate market value than the stock surrendered. The
Circuit Court of Appeals of the Circuit held the difference to be
taxable income under the Revenue Act of 1918,' which provided
that when in connection with the reorganization, merger, or consolidation of a corporation a person receives in place of stock
owned by him new stock of a greater aggregate par or face value,
the excess in par or face value shall be treated as a taxable gain
to the extent that the fair market value of the new stock is greater than the cost of the stock exchanged.2 The plaintiff contended
his interest was precisely the same before and after consolidation,
and that the excess aggregate par value of the stock received was
in the nature of a stock dividend, which has been held not taxable
under the Federal law.' The Court answered the contention with

8Schadt

v. Brill, 173 Mich. 647, 139 N. W. 878 (1913).
The West Virginia decisions on equitable servitudes are limited and do
not present a very consistent or detailed picture of the device. For additional
cases see Robinson v. Edgell, 57 W. Va. 157, 49 S. E. 1027 (1905); Hennen
v. Deveny, 71 W. Va. 629, 77 S. E. 142 (1913); Harper v. The Virginian
Railway Co., 76 W. Va. 788, 86 S. E. 919 (1915); Withers v. Ward, 86 W.
Va. 558, 104 S. E. 96 (1920); Cole v. Seamonds, 87 W. Va. 19, 104 S. E.
747 (1920); United Fuel Gas Co. v. Morley Oil & Gas Co., 102 W. Va. 374,
135 S. E. 399 (1926); White v. White, 108 W. Va. 128, 150 S. E. 53 (1929).
9

202 (b), 40 Stat. 1060.
The Act also provides:
....
. but when in connection with the reorganization, merger, or consolidation of a corporation a person receives in place
of stock or securities owned by him new stock or securities of no greater
aggregate par or face value, no gain or loss shall be deemed to occur from
the exchange."
3A stock dividend is not taxable as income. Walsh v. Brewster, 255 U.
1§
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